We show that any communication finding a value-maximizing allocation in a privateinformation economy must also discover supporting prices (in general personalized and nonlinear). In particular, to allocate L indivisible objects, a price must be revealed for each of the 2 L − 1 bundles. We prove that all monotonic prices must be used, hence exponential communication in L is needed. Furthermore, exponential communication is needed just to ensure a higher share of surplus than that realized by auctioning all objects as a bundle, or even a higher expected surplus (for some probability distribution over valuations). When the utilities are submodular, efficiency still requires exponential communication (and fully polynomial approximation is impossible). When the objects are homogeneous, arbitrarily good approximation is obtained with exponentially less communication than exact efficiency.
Introduction
We have recently seen great interest in so-called combinatorial auctions, designed to allocate L heterogeneous indivisible items among N bidders whose valuations for the different items can be interdependent. Recent important applications include auctions of FCC spectrum licenses and online procurement (see Vohra and de Vries (2002) for an overview). The objective of an auction is to elicit enough information about bidders' preferences so as to realize an efficient or approximately efficient allocation. The mechanism design literature has used the Revelation Principle to ensure the bidders' incentives to reveal their preferences truthfully (e.g., using the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke transfers).
However, full revelation of a bidder's preferences requires naming a willingness to pay 2003)). The hope was that such designs could achieve or at least approximate efficiency, while allowing bidders to communicate much less than their complete preferences. This paper demonstrates that the hope is not justified.
We evaluate the communication requirements of allocation problems by establishing the indispensable role of prices in finding efficient allocations in economies with distributed information. Intellectual origins of this idea lie in the early 20th-century debate on central planning alternatives to the market system. Hayek (1945) argued that prices succinctly summarize the knowledge of "particular circumstances of time and place,"
which is too enormous to be communicated to a central planner. Hurwicz (1960) and Mount and Reiter (1974) formalized Hayek's intuition by showing that in classical con-priate incentives. The result also implies that the simpler "nondeterministic" problem of verifying the efficiency of a proposed allocation is exactly that of announcing supporting prices along with the allocation.
In the classical convex economy one could restrict attention to prices that are Walrasian (i.e., anonymous and linear in consumption), which are much easier to communicate than the agents' preferences. In the combinatorial allocation problem, on the other hand, we show that a huge price space must be used in order to ensure equilibrium existence. Specifically, we show that any possible ¡ 2 L − 1 ¢ -dimensional price vector listing the prices of all bundles of objects is a unique equilibrium price vector for some valuation profile. Since any efficient mechanism must communicate such a vector, it follows that it must be at least as extensive as a full revelation of one agent's preferences.
Our approach can also be extended to the problem of approximating the maximum total surplus within a constant. For this purpose, note that in the "discretized" problem in which the valuations are restricted to be multiples of δ > 0, any misallocation loses at least surplus δ. Therefore, approximating the maximum surplus within less than δ is at least as hard as realizing exact efficiency in the discretized problem. Since the discretized problem can always be solved with finite communication, the relevant measure of the communication burden is the number of transmitted bits. Such discrete problems have been examined in the computer science field of communication complexity, pioneered by Yao (1979) and surveyed in Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) . 3 Since exact efficiency in the discretized problem still requires the communication of (discrete) prices, we are able to show that guaranteeing a better approximation of efficiency than that achieved by auctioning off all objects as a bundle still requires communicating a very large number of bits, which grows exponentially with L. 3 The general communication complexity problem is to compute a function (in our case, desired allocation) whose inputs (in our case, agents' preferences) are distributed among agents. The communication complexity literature has developed in parallel with, and shares many techniques with, the economic literature on real-valued communication. For more detailed comparisons of the two literatures, see Marschak (1996) and Van Zandt (1999).
The concept of approximation used above required uniform approximation of maximum surplus across all states. Similarly, the communication burden was defined as the maximum number of bits transmitted across states. Instead of using such "worst-case" measures, one may assume a probability distribution over possible valuations, and ask how many bits must be transmitted on expectation to realize a given expected surplus. We show that, for some joint probability distribution over the agents' valuations, achieving a higher expected surplus than that from the bundled auction still requires communicating an exponential expected number of bits. 4 These results imply that the only hope to achieve or approximate efficiency without enormous communication is by focusing on cases in which the agents' preferences (or probability distribution over them) are known a priori to lie in a certain class. One example is given by valuations satisfying the "(gross) substitute property" of Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Gul and Stacchetti (1999) . With such valuations, a Walrasian equilibrium with L per item prices exists, and as we show here, it can be found with (truly) polynomial communication. However, the substitute property is very restrictive. We show that for the somewhat larger class of "submodular" valuations (i.e., those exhibiting diminishing marginal utility of items), efficiency still requires very extensive communication, and a fast (so-called "fully polynomial") approximation is impossible.
Finally, we consider the case where the items are known to be homogeneous, and so agents only care about the number of objects consumed. This case exhibits a drastic difference between the communication requirements of exact and approximate efficiency.
Namely, exact efficiency again requires at least as much communication as a full description of one agent's preferences, which in this case takes L numbers. On the other hand, approximation within any given ε (more generally, fully polynomial approximation) is achieved with only O (log L) bits. In the setting considered by Calsamiglia (1977) , the homogeneous good to be allocated is divisible, and exact efficiency requires infinitelydimensional communication, yet we construct a fully polynomial approximation that 4 We prove this particular result using a different technique. The proof uses a lower bound on the communication complexity of approximate set packing, which is derived in the Appendix.
allocates the good in small discrete units (provided that the valuations satisfy a weak smoothness condition). Thus, in this particular case an enormous savings in communication can be achieved with only a slight sacrifice in economic efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general allocation problem, the model of communication, and the measures of the communication burden.
In Section 3 we characterize efficient communication as that discovering a price equilibrium. In Section 4 we use this characterization to derive a lower bound on the burden of efficient communication. In Section 5 we define the concepts of approximation and relate them to the analysis of discretized problems. In Section 6 we apply the results to the combinatorial allocation problem. In Section 7 we examine the problem with several restricted classes of valuations. Section 8 presents average-case analysis. Section 9 discusses the relation of our results to the computational complexity literature. Section 10 discusses how agents could be given the incentives to obey the suggested communication protocols. Section 11 concludes.
2 The Allocation Problem and Communication
The allocation problem
Let N be the finite set of agents, and K be the set of allocations. (With a slight abuse of notation, we will use the same letter to denote a set and its cardinality when this causes no confusion.) An agent's valuation assigns real values to all allocations, and is therefore represented with a vector in R K . The class of possible valuations of agent i ∈ N is denoted by U i ⊂ R K . Agent i's valuation u i ∈ U i is assumed to be his privately observed
The objective is to implement an allocation rule, which is a correspondence (relation)
For each state u ∈ U , the allocation rule describes the subset F (u) ⊂ K of "desirable" allocations. For example, we may be interested in the efficient allocation rule, which selects the allocations maximizing the sum of the agents' valuations (total surplus):
Identification of efficiency with surplus-maximization is based on the ability to compensate agents with monetary transfers, and the quasilinearity of their payoffs in these transfers. Approximate efficient allocation rules will be defined in Section 5 below.
Communication
We now describe communication procedures that solve the allocation problem. It is well known that communication can be shortened by letting agents send messages sequentially rather than simultaneously. For example, an agent need not report his valuation for allocation k if previous messages have made it clear that k stands no chance of being efficient. Therefore, we must consider multi-stage communication protocols.
In the language of game theory, a general communication protocol is described with an extensive-form message game as well as each agent's strategy in this game (complete action plan contingent on his type and observed history). Instead of payoffs, the game assigns allocations to terminal nodes (and so is more properly called a "game form,"
or "mechanism"). The agents are assumed to follow the prescribed strategies (their incentives to do so will be discussed in Section 10). Such communication protocols are called "deterministic," because the message sent by an agent at a given information set is fully determined by his type and the preceding messages. A protocol realizes allocation rule F if in every state u ∈ U it achieves a terminal node to which an allocation from
Dealing with deterministic communication protocols is quite cumbersome. Analysis can be simplified by considering what is known as "nondeterministic communication" in computer science and as the "verification scenario" in economics. Imagine an omniscient oracle who knows the true state u, and consequently knows a "desirable" allocation k ∈ F (u), but has to prove to an ignorant outsider that k is indeed desirable. He carries out the proof by publicly announcing a message m ∈ M. Each agent i either accepts or rejects the message, doing this on the basis of his own type u i . The set of messages acceptable to all agents in state u is described by the message correspondence µ(u). Formally, we define nondeterministic communication as follows:
where M is the message set, µ : U ³ M is the message correspondence, and h : M → K is the outcome function, and the message correspondence µ has the following properties:
Existence means that an acceptable message exists in each state. Privacy Preservation follows from the fact that each agent does not observe other agents' types when making his acceptance decision, thus the set of messages acceptable to him is a function µ i (u i ) of his own type u i only. 6 Finally, the definition of realization says that the acceptance of a message m by all agents proves to the outsider that h (m) ∈ F (u).
Definition 1 has a nice interpretation in terms of geometric properties of the subsets µ −1 (m) of the state space U, each such subset being the event in which a given message m occurs. In this interpretation, described in Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) , Existence requires that the collection {µ −1 (m)} m∈M of such events cover the state space U. Privacy Preservation requires that each element of the covering be a product set µ
N (m)-a "rectangle" in computer science parlance. Realization requires that for each rectangle µ −1 (m) from the covering, a single outcome h (m) be "desirable" on the whole rectangle (in computer science parlance, the rectangle is "monochromatic").
The burden of discrete and continuous communication
The ( The computer science literature on communication complexity considers discrete communication, in which the elementary messages convey a bit of information (see Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) ). 7 In particular, in the nondeterministic case, the minimal binary encoding of the oracle's message from set M takes log |M| bits. (log will stand for the binary logarithm to simplify notation).
In the case of continuous communication, agents are allowed to send real-valued elementary messages. We also want to allow finite-valued messages (say, to communicate discrete combinatorial allocations), but not count them toward the communication burden. Thus, the worst-case burden of continuous communication is defined as the maximum number of real-valued elementary messages sent in the course of the protocol. In the nondeterministic case, we can identify the communication burden with the dimension of the oracle's message space M, for which purpose we must define a topology on M.
A well-known problem in continuous communication is the possibility of "smuggling" multidimensional information in a one-dimensional message space, (e.g., using the inverse Peano function). Note, however, that with such "smuggling," a small error in the message would yield a huge error in its meaning. To avoid this, we define a metric on messages based on their meaning: the distance between messages m and m 0 is defined as the Hausdorff distance between the events µ −1 (m) and µ −1 (m 0 ) in which they occur. space is taken as given, and dimension smuggling is ruled out by requiring the communication protocol to satisfy a "regularity" restriction. The typical restriction, introduced by Mount and Reiter (1974) and Walker (1977) , is that the message correspondence µ be "locally threaded"-i.e., have a continuous selection on a neighborhood of any point. 8 Formally, the distance is defined as
with ρ U describing the given metric on the state space U .
This restriction rules out a priori some important communication protocols, e.g., the communication of discrete allocations (µ cannot have a continuous selection in a neighborhood in which the allocation switches).
Efficient Communication and Supporting Prices
One particular way to verify the efficiency of an allocation is by announcing supporting prices:
where k ∈ K is the proposed allocation and p ∈ R NK is a list of personalized allocation prices, is a price equilibrium in state u ∈ U if it satisfies the following inequalities:
(1) says that the proposed allocation maximizes each agent's utility net of the announced prices. (2) can be interpreted as requiring that the proposed allocation maximize the designer's revenue given the announced prices. Denote the set of price equilibria in state u by E (u), and let E : U ³ R NK × K denote the price equilibrium correspondence.
A price equilibrium with N = 2 agents is illustrated in Figure 1 . Without loss of generality we normalize both agents' utilities and prices for the equilibrium allocation k to zero, and graph agent 1's valuations and prices for all allocations in the downward direction, and those of agent 2 in the upward direction. (The economic interpretation of Figure 1 is as an "Edgeworth box" whose vertical dimension represents the split of money between the two agents, and whose horizontal dimension represents the allocations. In this interpretation, u 1 and u 2 depict the agents' respective indifference curves passing through the equilibrium point, and p 1 and p 2 depict the boundaries of their respective budget sets.) (2) says that the curve representing p 1 must lie above that representing p 2 , and (1) that the curve representing u 1 is above that for p 1 and the curve representing u 2 is below that for p 2 .
This general notion of price equilibrium was first suggested by Mas-Colell (1980), and later used by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) for combinatorial allocation problems. These papers have made the observation that all price equilibrium allocations are efficient, often referred to as the First Welfare Theorem.
In Figure 1 , efficiency simply means that u 1 must lie above u 2 .
The First Welfare Theorem allows to verify efficiency with a price protocol, whose message space is M ⊂ R NK ×K, whose message correspondence is µ (u) = E (u)∩M, and whose outcome function is h (p, k) = k. Note that we allow many different price protocols One might think that among all possible efficient communication protocols, there would be some that are distinct from, and perhaps much simpler than, price protocols.
However, we establish that this is not the case-any efficient communication protocol must reveal supporting equilibrium prices:
9 Proposition 1 Communication protocol Γ = hM, µ, hi realizes the efficient allocation rule F * if and only if there exists an assignment p : M → R NK of prices to messages such that protocol hM, µ, hp, hii realizes the price equilibrium correspondence E.
Proof. The "if" statement obtains by adding up all inequalities (1) and (2). For the "only if" statement, suppose protocol hM, µ, hi realizes F * . For each m ∈ M, let k = h (m), and let p ik = sup u i ∈µ
By construction, 9 A similar result is established by Parkes (2002) , but only for a restricted communication language.
using Privacy Preservation and the fact thatk ∈ F * (u) for each u ∈ µ −1 (m). Thus, ³ p,k´also satisfies (2). Therefore, ³ p,k´is a price equilibrium in every state u ∈ µ −1 (m).
The "if" statement of the Proposition is the First Welfare Theorem. The "only if"
statement can be thought of as a strengthening of the traditional Second Welfare Theorem, which says only that for any efficient allocation we can construct supporting prices
given full information about the economy. For general price equilibria, the construction is trivial: for example, we can simply take prices
Welfare Theorem is not a very useful result, because with full information, an efficient allocation can be implemented directly, without using prices. In contrast, Proposition 1 says not only that supporting prices exist, but also that they must be revealed by any efficient communication, not just by full revelation.
The proof of the "only if" part of Proposition 1 for two agents is illustrated in Figure   2 , which depicts the valuations in the same way as Figure 2 ). Therefore, letting agent 1's price curve p 1 be the lower envelope of his valuation curves consistent with m, and letting agent 2's price curve p 2 be the upper envelope of his valuation curves consistent with m, p 1 will lie above p 2 , thus the prices will satisfy condition (2) . Also, by construction, the prices will satisfy condition is in general a hard problem, below we derive some upper and lower bounds for it in specific cases (and in some of these cases the two bounds match).
A Lower Bound on Efficient Communication
Note that two utility functions that differ by a constant describe the same preferences. In counting the states of the world, we will need to ensure that we do not count two different states describing the same preferences. Similarly, in measuring the metric dimension of (subsets of) the state space, we need to ensure that the dimensionality of utility functions coincides with the dimensionality of preferences. For these purposes, we assume that any two preferences that are "close" to each other are described by utility functions that are close to each other:
The state space U is normalized if there exists C > 0 such that for all u, u 0 ∈ U,
In particular, a normalized state space U cannot contain two distinct states between which each agent's utility differs only by a constant. For example, normalization holds (with C = 1) when each agent is always assigned zero utility to one of the allocations.
Now we can show that the subset of the state space on which all allocations are equally efficient constitutes a "fooling set" for the price equilibrium correspondence. Namely,
we show that two distinct states from U * cannot have the same supporting prices:
Proof. Suppose in negation that
. u ∈ U * means that the total surplus P i u ik does not depend on k ∈ K, and therefore (2) can be written in state u as
On the other hand, (1) means that
Comparing the two displays, we see that for each i, u ik − p ik does not depend on k ∈ K.
Since by the same argument the same is true for u
The proof of Lemma 1 for the case N = 2 can be illustrated graphically in Figure 1 , by observing that in any state from U * , the two agents' valuation curves coincide, and the price curves are squeezed in-between. Therefore, both agents' prices must coincide with their utilities (up to a constant). Different states from U * will give rise to different indifference curves and will therefore pin down different price curves.
We can now use Proposition 1 to conclude that any efficient communication protocol must yield distinct messages in distinct states from U * . This implies that the protocol uses at least |U * | distinct messages. A similar statement can be made for continuous communication, though extra care should be taken to rule out "dimension smuggling":
In a normalized quasilinear problem, any efficient protocol transmits at least log |U * | bits, and the dimension of its message space is at least dim U * .
Proof. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 together imply that the restriction of the message correspondence µ to U * has an injective selection σ : U * → µ (U * ). This implies the first statement of the proposition. For the second statement, we will also show that σ −1 is Lipschitz continuous. For this purpose, take any m, m 0 ∈ µ (U * ), and let u = σ −1 (m),
. By the construction of the metric on messages (see footnote 8), 
, and taking the absolute value implies:
Now, using normalization and the triangle inequality,
The simplest application of Proposition 2 is to the case N = 2:
Corollary 1 Suppose that in a normalized quasilinear problem with N = 2, for each u 1 ∈ U 1 there exists a "dual utility" u 2 ∈ U 2 such that u 1k + u 2k does not depend on k. Then any efficient protocol transmits at least log |U 1 | bits and has the message space dimension of at least dim U 1 .
Corollary 1 will be a workhorse for the subsequent results on the combinatorial allocation problem. We will apply it also to N > 2 agents by letting agents i > 2 have constant utilities over all allocations k. Also, Corollary 1 can be applied to some cases in which the two agents can have dual utilities only on some subsetK ⊂ K of allocations, by restricting attention to a subclass of utilities for which allocations from K\K are never efficient (see Subsection 7.1).
Approximation and Discretized Problems
One may hope that approximate efficiency could be achieved with less communication than exact efficiency. In this section we discuss how to analyze the communication burden of approximate efficiency. To be consistent with the computer science literature on approximation (see, e.g., Vazirani (2001)), we use an approximation measure that is invariant to the units of measurement (see, e.g., Vazirani (2001)). Namely, defining the maximum surplus available in state u by
we define the choice correspondence F * r realizing approximation ratio r ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
By construction, F * 1 = F * (the exactly efficient correspondence), and the set F * r (u) is nonincreasing in r for all u.
For the study of approximation, we need to assume
The communication burden of F * r can be evaluated by examining the communication burden of the exactly efficient correspondence F * in a discretized problem. In computer science, discrete problems are usually considered in their own right (the inputs are restricted to be integers), but we will use them as a stepping stone for the analysis of approximation in the continuous problem.
For each state u ∈ U, let u δ denote the state in which all utilities are rounded off to multiples of δ > 0. Define the upper δ-discretized problem as the problem with the discrete state space
Suppose that we have a protocol Γ realizing exact efficiency for problem U δ . We can then ask the agents to round off their utilities to multiples of δ and follow protocol Γ. Since the sum of rounded-off utilities for every allocation is within Nδ/2 from the true surplus at this allocation, the maximization of this sum results in a surplus loss of at most Nδ. Since the maximum available surplus is bounded below by S, we realize approximation ratio 1 − Nδ/S, using as much communication as in Γ. In particular, full revelation of valuations rounded off with a sufficiently fine precision achieves an approximation ratio arbitrarily close to 1.
Examination of a discretized problem also allows to bound the communication burden of approximation from below. For this purpose, define the lower δ-discretized problem as the problem with the discrete state space U δ ∩ U . This state space consists of those valuations from U that are multiples of δ. (In most applications considered in this paper, 12 Both inequalities are needed to ensure that approximation can be achieved with finite communication. For example, consider the problem of allocating one object between two agents whose valuations lie in [0, 1], and so S = 0. Pick r ∈ (0, 1), and consider the restricted problem in which both agents' valuations lie in the set {r
In this restricted problem, realizing an approximation ratio higher than r is equivalent to exact efficiency, and Corollary 1 implies that this requires a countable message space. Since arbitrary r ∈ (0, 1) can be chosen, this implies that no positive approximation can • A Polynomial Approximation Scheme (PAS) in some parameters is a protocol that for any given ε > 0 realizes approximation ratio 1 − ε using a number of bits that is polynomial in the parameters.
• A Fully Polynomial Approximation Scheme (FPAS) in some parameters is a protocol that for any ε > 0 realizes approximation ratio 1 − ε using a number of bits that is polynomial in ε −1 and the parameters.
• A Truly Polynomial Approximation Scheme (TPAS) in some parameters is a protocol that for any ε > 0 realizes approximation ratio 1 − ε using a number of bits that is polynomial in log ε −1 and the parameters.
PAS achieves an arbitrarily close approximation with polynomial communication, but does not stipulate how the communication burden depends on the approximation error.
In contrast, in FPAS and TPAS, the error must shrink sufficiently fast with the number of bits transmitted. An economic example of FPAS is an ascending-bid auction for one unit with a minimum bid increment ε. Suppose that the agents' valuations for the unit lie in [1, 2] . At each price level starting from p = 1, the auction asks each agent to send one bit-"in" or "out." If at least one agent sends "in," the price is incremented by ε. The auction stops when all agents send "out," assigning the object to (one of) the agent(s)
who sent "in" in the previous stage. Suppose that the agents behave "truthfully"-send "in" if and only if their valuations exceed the current price. Then the auction is exactly efficient for the discretized problem U ε , and therefore, by Proposition 3(i), it realizes approximation ratio 1 − ε. Since the maximum number of price increments is ε −1 , the auction's worst-case complexity is Nε −1 .
TPAS requires a much faster approximation than FPAS-the error must now shrink exponentially with the number of bits transmitted. An economic example of TPAS is a sealed-bid auction of a single unit, in which the agents submit their valuations rounded off to a multiple of ε. Suppose the agents' valuations for the unit lie in [1, 2] . Since the auction is exactly efficient for the upper discretized problem U ε , by Proposition 3(i), it realizes approximation ratio 1 − ε. Since it takes log ε −1 bits to transmit a valuation rounded off to a multiple of ε, the total number of bits transmitted is N log ε −1 .
Note that our TPAS example was obtained by taking a fully efficient continuous protocol and asking the agents to round off their messages. This technique can be generalized: given a d-dimensional continuous protocol realizing approximation ratio r, rounding off the messages yields a TPAS to approximation ratio r that is linear in d. Intuitively, a message round-off error that is small in the Hausdorff metric defined in footnote 8 yields an allocation that is desirable for some state that is not too far from the true state, and therefore a small efficiency loss. Formally, we have
Proposition 4
In a quasilinear problem satisfying (3), if there exists a protocol realizing approximation ratio r with a message space of upper box dimension d > 0, 13 then for any ε > 0 there exists a protocol realizing approximation ratio r − ε using C (ε) bits, with
Proof. Suppose that Γ = hM, µ, hi is an efficient protocol. By the definition of upper box dimension, for each δ > 0 there exists a covering of M by balls of radius δ centered
Consider the protocol Γ δ = hM δ , µ δ , hi. Note that Γ δ inherits Existence and Privacy
Preservation from Γ. Take any state u ∈ U and any m δ ∈ µ δ (u). By construction,
. By the construction of the Hausdorff metric ρ on messages (see footnote 8), there exists u
This implies that (i) S (u) ≤ S (u 0 ) + δ, and (ii)
where the last inequality uses the fact that Γ realizes approximation ratio r, hence h (m δ ) ∈ F * r (u 0 ). Therefore, taking δ (ε) = εS/2 ensures that Γ δ(ε) realizes approximation ratio r − ε. The number of bits communicated by
In particular, the Proposition implies that if we discretize two efficient continuous protocols with message spaces of dimension d 1 and d 2 respectively to guarantee approximation error ε, then the worst-case complexities of the two discretized protocols are
14 Thus, the dimension of the continuous message space based on the Hausdorff metric over messages is indeed a relevant measure of 13 The upper box dimension coincides with the Hausdorff dimension for most "well-behaved" sets, but could exceed it for some sets (see Edgar (1990) ).
14 Conversely, if a given large number of bits C is to be transmitted in both cases, then the ratio of the approximation errors of the two protocols will grow exponentially with C when d we have continuous communication that is polynomial in some parameters and realizes approximation ratio r, then the discretized protocol is a TPAS for r in the same parameters. In such a case we will simply say that the discretized protocol is a "polynomial protocol realizing approximation ratio r."
The Combinatorial Allocation Problem
We now specialize to the Combinatorial Allocation (CA) problem, in which the allocation is that of L items among the N agents. Formally, the allocation space is K = N L , and
We impose several standard restrictions on valuations (which can only reduce the communication burden):
• No Externalities (NE): For each i and each
In words, each agent i's utility is a function v i of the bundle k −1 (i) allocated to him.
We will call v i the agent's valuation, and let V i ⊂ R 2 L denote the class of his possible valuations. The state space can then be represented by
Each v i ∈ V i is also assumed to satisfy the following restrictions:
• Normalization (N): v i (∅) = 0.
• Monotonicity (M):
• Boundedness (B):
(N) is without loss of generality, and it serves to rule out distinct valuations that differ only by a constant, thus describing the same preferences. It also ensures the Observe that approximation ratio 1/N can be realized by auctioning off all objects as a bundle to the highest bidder. (Indeed, the bundled auction realizes surplus max i v i (L), while no individual agent can have a higher utility than that at any allocation.) Thus, Proposition 6 means that for N = 2, any improvement upon the bundled auction still requires very extensive communication, which still grows exponentially with L. 17 In fact, we can prove a similar statement for N > 2, though using a different proving technique:
Proposition 7 In the combinatorial allocation problem with general valuations, realizing an approximation ratio higher than 1/N requires communicating at least ln 2 · exp {L/ (2N 2 ) − 2 ln N} bits.
Proof. In the Appendix we consider the following set packing problem: Each of the N agents holds a collection of subsets of L, and the goal is to approximate the maximum packing number-the number of subsets in the union of their collections that are packed together, i.e., are pairwise disjoint. The set packing problem is reduced to the combinatorial allocation problem by letting, for each agent i, v i (S) be the maximum number of subsets in his collection that can be packed into S. We prove a lower bound on the 16 Note that¯V 1 gen¯i s the number of monotone boolean functions of L boolean variables. The problem of counting these functions is known as "Dedekind's problem," which is unsolved, though its asymptotic behavior is obtained by Korshunov (1981) . 17 Indeed, by Stirling's formula, the communication burden show that this algorithm realizes approximation ratio r(L) = 1/ √ L, which is higher than that realized by the bundled auction when N > √ L.
Observe that these improvements over the bundled auction do no contradict Proposition 7. Intuitively, the proposition implies that in large problems in which the number N of agents is "substantially smaller" than the number L of items (e.g., smaller than L 1/2−ε ), "simple" protocols (e.g., polynomial in L) cannot improve over the bundled auction. When N is either comparable with or larger than L, simple protocols can improve over bundled auctions, though both bundled auctions and all other simple protocols realize a vanishing share of the available surplus as N, L → ∞.
Restricted Valuations

Submodular Valuations
Here each agent's valuation space V i = V sm is the set of all valuations v ∈ V gen that satisfy
An equivalent definition of submodularity is that the marginal benefit of each item l ∈ L,
Corollary 1 cannot be applied to this case directly, since the dual (4) of a submodular valuation is typically not submodular (unless both are additive-see Subsection 7.3 below). We get around this problem by defining duality in such a way that the surplus is constant only on the allocations involving even splits of objects:
Namely, consider the setṼ of valuations v ∈ R 2 L satisfying
One can easily verify thatṼ ⊂ V sm .
Note that in any state (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈Ṽ ×Ṽ , all efficient allocations lie inK. (Indeed, the last bullet implies that the average surplus of all allocations fromK is 2 − 1/L, while any other allocation has a surplus of at most 2 − 2/L, and thus is dominated by at least one allocation fromK.) The last bullet above ensures that thus constructed valuation class with allocations restricted toK is normalized.
For each v ∈Ṽ , define its "quasi-dual" b v ∈Ṽ as follows:
By construction, the set of efficient allocations in any state (v, b v) ∈Ṽ ×Ṽ is exactlỹ K. Thus, we can apply Corollary 1 with the two agents' valuations restricted toṼ and the allocations restricted toK, which yields Proposition 8 In the combinatorial allocation problem with submodular valuations, the dimension of the message space in any efficient protocol is at
Consider now the discretized problemṼ δ ⊂Ṽ with δ = 1/L and N = 2. Applying Corollary 1 with the two agents' valuations restricted toṼ δ and the outcomes restricted toK implies that the number of bits communicated by an efficient protocol for the discretized problem is at least log¯Ṽ δ¯=¯K¯− 1. Proposition 3(ii) then implies Proposition 9 With submodular valuations, realizing an approximation ratio higher
Note that if we had a FPAS in L, then it could be used to realize approximation ratio 1 − 1/ (2L) using polynomial communication in L, contradicting Proposition 9.
Therefore, we have
Corollary 2 With submodular valuations, FPAS in L is impossible.
This result implies, for example, that an ascending-bid auction with L per-item prices and bid increment ε cannot approximate efficiency within ε, because the auction's worstcase complexity would be NLε −1 , and so it would be a FPAS. Yet, we have been unable to rule out PAS -i.e., achieving any approximation ratio with polynomial communication in N, L. We do know from Lehmann et al. (2001) that approximation ratio 1/2 is realized by the (deterministic) "greedy" protocol that allocates the objects in a fixed order to the agents who announce the highest current marginal benefit for them, and so communicates only NL numbers.
Homogeneous Valuations
Here each agent's valuation space V i = V h is the set of valuations v ∈ V gen that satisfy On the other hand, the full revelation protocol in the discretized problem V bits.
Corollary 3 In the combinatorial allocation problem with homogeneous valuations, (i)
TPAS in log L is impossible even for N = 2 and γ = 1, but (ii) full revelation of rounded off valuations is a FPAS in parameters log L, N, and γ −1 .
Proof. (i) If there existed a TPAS in log L, then realizing approximation ratio 1−1/ (4L)
would take only polynomial communication in log L. By Proposition 11(i), however, it requires communicating at least log ¡ 2L+L−1
(ii) By Proposition 11(ii), full revelation of valuations rounded off to multiples of εγ realizes approximation ratio 1 − ε using at most Nε is exponential in log L. Intuitively, this means that when the number L of objects is large, and we have a protocol that achieves a close approximation of efficiency, a small reduction in inefficiency requires an enormous increase in communication.
Our analysis can also be related to the model of Calsamiglia (1977) 
for some A > 0. Under this mild strengthening of continuity (for example, implied by
Hölder continuity of any degree), restricting agents to consume the good in L = 2
identical discrete units reduces the surplus by at most N (log L) −A = Nεγ. Running the protocol described in Corollary 3(ii) on this discretized allocation space will approximate the maximum surplus within 2Nεγ, and so realize approximation ratio 1 − 2ε, while
Thus, we have a FPAS, even though exact efficiency in this case requires infinite-dimensional communication.
Substitute Valuations
Here each agent's valuation space V i = V sub is the set of valuations v ∈ V gen whose indirect
+ . This is one of the many equivalent definitions of the substitute property-see Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Milgrom (2000) . 21 Since V sub ⊂ V sm (see Gul and Stacchetti (1999) ), the dual (4) of a substitute valuation is not one, except when both are additive, i.e., take the form v (S) = P l∈S φ l for some φ ∈ R L . Let V add denote the class of additive valuations. Since V add ⊂ V sub , and the dual of an additive valuation is itself, Corollary 1 yields 19 Calsamiglia (1977) restricts the valuation of agent 1 to be concave and that of agent 2 to be convex.
Since the dual of a concave valuation is convex, the analysis goes through without modification. Similarly, the agents' valuations can be restricted to be arbitrarily smooth, since smoothness is preserved under duality. 20 In contrast, when both agents' valuations are known to be concave, a Walrasian equilibrium with a single real-valued price exists and realizes efficiency (regardless of whether the good is divisible or not).
Proposition 12
In the combinatorial allocation problem with additive or substitute valuations, the dimension of the message space in any efficient protocol is at least dim V add =
L.
This lower bound is attained by the Walrasian equilibrium with per-object prices, which always exists with substitute valuations (Kelso and Crawford 1982, Gul and Stacchetti 1999).
A major disadvantage of the Walrasian protocol is that it is nondeterministic, leaving open the question of how to find an equilibrium. Deterministic protocols achieving this were proposed by Gul and Stachetti (2000) and Ausubel (2002) . These protocols are variations on the ascending-bid auction with prices quoted for individual items, and so they are only FPAS. This is in fact true of all proposed approximation protocols based on the primal-dual schema (see, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. (2001)).
We improve upon the proposed auction designs by describing a TPAS for this setting.
For this purpose, we write the efficient allocation problem as an integer programming problem, letting x iS = 1 if agent i's allocation k −1 (i) = S and x iS = 0 otherwise. As shown by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) , if a Walrasian equilibrium exists then any efficient allocation must also solve the relaxed surplus-maximization program in which fractional allocations x iS are allowed:
Linear program (P) has only N +L constraints but an exponential number of variables, so it would be hard to solve it directly. It is easier to solve the dual program
where p l and w i denote the Lagrange multipliers with the constraints in (P) associated with object l and agent i respectively. Examination of the complementary slackness con- but instead of each oracle query, asking each agent i to report a bundle S that gives him a higher net utility than his "utility target" w i at the current price vector p. If such a report is made by one of the agents, the protocol continues. It is known that when the inputs (valuations) are discrete multiples of δ, the separation-based algorithm produces a solution within a number of steps that is polynomial in the number of variables (in our case N + L) and log δ −1 (the size of each "input" number). Since at each step there are at most N numbers and bundles announced by the agents, the whole protocol uses polynomial communication in N, L, and log δ −1 . Thus, we have a polynomial procedure to calculate the value of δ-discretized program (P), which approximates the true value of (P) to within Nδ/2. An approximate integer solution to (P) can then be deduced using standard computational techniques of self-reduction, yielding a TPAS.
22 22 Indeed, since (P) has an integer solution, there exists an allocation of item 1 that does not reduce its value, and so does not reduce the value of the δ-discretized (P) by more than N δ. Thus, let us find an agent such that upon allocating item 1 to him, the value of the δ-discretized (P) does not fall by more
Average-case Analysis
Suppose that we are given a probability distribution over the states of the world. Then we can relax the notion of approximation to the requirement that only the expected surplus be close to optimal. At the same time, we can count the expected rather than worst-case number of bits transmitted, which allows a savings from coding more frequent messages with fewer bits (as in Shannon's (1948) Proof. Consider the set packing problem described in the proof of Proposition 7. In the Appendix we prove a lower bound on the communication complexity of distinguishing between the states in which N subsets can be packed from those in which only one subset can be packed (and each agent's individual packing number is at most 1), which applies to randomized protocols with any bounded error. Using the equivalence of randomized than N δ. Such allocation of item 1 may not be exactly optimal, but it will not reduce the value of (P)
by more than 2N δ. Then allocate item 2 in the same fashion, then item 3, etc. Since we try allocating each item to each agent, we will use NL calls to the polynomial procedure solving the δ-discretized (P).
Since the accumulated loss of surplus is at most L · 2N δ, we have a TPAS. complexity and distributional complexity (which follows from the Minimax Theoremsee Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997, Section 3.4) ), it follows that for some sequence of distributions over states, our lower bound applies to the "Discrimination Problem" of distinguishing the states with surplus S(v) = N from those with S(v) = 1 correctly with probability at least 1/2 + ε/4. In particular, we must have Pr {S (v) = N} ≤ 1/2 + ε/4, for otherwise declaring "N" would solve the Discrimination Problem.
Now consider the conditional distribution on states with S (v) = N (assigning probability zero to all other states), so that the maximum expected surplus is N. Any protocol Γ that achieves fraction 1/N + ε of it on the conditional distribution must realize a surplus greater than 1 with probability at least ε. We can adapt Γ to solve the Discrimination Problem for the original distribution as follows: Run Γ and ask the agents to announce their utilities at the realized allocation. Declare "N" if the sum of the announcements exceeds 1, declare "1" otherwise. The probability of error is at most
, hence the protocol solves the Discrimination Problem. This implies that Γ must satisfy our lower bound, which is stated in the Proposition.
Since the bundled auction guarantees share 1/N of the expected surplus, the Proposition implies that for some joint distribution over the agents' valuations, achieving a higher expected surplus than the bundled auction still requires expected communication that is exponential in L.
In the distribution constructed in the above proposition, the valuations are not necessarily independently distributed. We can obtain a (weaker) lower bound on approximation for independently distributed valuations using the distributional lower bounds of Proof. We will use a reduction to the "disjointness problem" from communication complexity theory (See Kushilevitz and Nisan 1997) . In this problem, each agent i = 1, 2 is given a subset X i a set M, and the objective is to decide whether X 1 ∩ X 2 = ∅.
Babai, Frankl, and Simon (1986) prove a lower bound on the distributional complexity of disjointness for product distributions: must err with at least 1% probability when attempting to solve the disjointness problem.
We will now show that any protocol for combinatorial allocation that achieves 99.5% solve the disjointness problem on X 1 and X 2 , the two parties can each create a valuation according to the rule specified above, solve the combinatorial allocation problem, and declare that X 1 and X 2 are not disjoint when the obtained allocation has value 2, and disjoint otherwise. Observe that finding an allocation with surplus 2 means finding a partition of L into two sets (S, L\S) of size L/2 each such that S ∈ X 1 and S ∈ X 2 , thus proving that X 1 and X 2 are not disjoint. Thus, the declaration of non-disjointness is always correct. On the other hand, since any inefficient allocation loses at least half the available surplus, an allocation protocol that loses at most 0.5% of expected surplus cannot produce an inefficient allocation with probability more than 1%. Therefore, the probability of falsely declaring disjointness is at most 1%.
The proof is done for c = 99.5%, which is derived from a constant quoted in Babai, Frankl, and Simon (1986) . No optimization of the constant was attempted and it seems likely that a substantial strengthening is possible.
Comparison with Computational Complexity
The 
Incentives
So far we have ignored the agents' incentives to follow the prescribed strategies. If the agents behave in their self-interest, the designer faces additional "incentive-compatibility" constraints requiring that the agents' strategies constitute an equilibrium of the communication game. In this section, we show how in the quasilinear case, these constraints may be satisfied using monetary transfers.
Suppose that after running the protocol, we ask each agent to report his payoff u i at the resulting allocation, and pay each agent i a transfer t i = P j6 =i u i . This transfer scheme (first proposed by Reichelstein (1984, pp.45-46) ) ensures that each agent's total payoff equals the total surplus, and so converts the communication game into one of common interest. (In the terminology of Marschak and Radner (1972) , the agents become a "team"). If the protocol is efficient, then obeying the prescribed strategies constitutes an ex post equilibrium under the described transfer scheme: no unilateral deviation by an agent can increase his payoff in any state. 24 But what if the protocol is not exactly but only approximately efficient? The behavior of rational agents in such a protocol will depend on their beliefs. Let us make the standard assumption in economics that the agents have a common prior over the states of the world, and that they play a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game defined by the protocol. Since the game is one of common interest under the proposed transfer scheme, the strategy profile maximizing the expected surplus constitutes a BNE of the game. In particular, this BNE cannot have a lower expected surplus than that achieved by the original protocol. In other words, if the agents coordinate on this BNE, it will achieve the best average-case approximation consistent with the game. 25 Of course, this relies heavily on the agents' rationality-both individual (being able to calculate an optimal strategy profile) and collective (being able to coordinate on it). But if agents are not fully rational, it is not clear how to consider their incentives in the first place.
A possible criticism of the proposed transfer scheme is that it is very costly. The cost can be covered with lump-sum participation fees, but these fees may be restricted by the agents' participation constraints. The largest fee that still guarantees agent i's participation is the surplus that could be achieved in his absence. (This makes an agent indifferent about participating when he does not contribute anything to the surplus, and strictly prefer to participate otherwise.) Together with the transfer scheme, this gives each agent his Vickrey-Groves-Clarke (VCG) payoff. As noted by Reichelstein (1984) and Ausubel (2002) , calculation of the participation fees requires running the protocol with successively removing each agent, which multiplies the communication burden by 24 In general, obedience will not be a dominant strategy, since an agent i may gain from a deviation if he expects another agent j to use a strategy that is not consistent with any type u j . 25 To take this observation to its extreme, under our transfer scheme, rational agents need not be offered a protocol at all! Namely, given an explicit expression for communication costs, the agents could be made to internalize these costs (e.g., by paying for sending bits). Then if the agents play some "free form" game in which they can individually send messages and implement an allocation, the protocol that maximizes the expected surplus net of communication costs will constitute a BNE of the game. 
Conclusion
Price mechanisms are the most commonly observed and the best studied economic allocation mechanisms. However, until now there has not been a complete understanding of their role. To be sure, the Welfare Theorems show that the Walrasian price mechanism produces efficient allocations in convex economies. Still, the possibility remained that other mechanisms also produce efficient allocations in convex economies, or that nonprice mechanisms perform better than price mechanisms in nonconvex economies. The designers of combinatorial auctions have proposed numerous designs that purport to find efficient allocations without finding all the prices supporting them.
The present paper has shown that in fact, any efficient mechanism is "essentially" a price mechanism, in the sense that it must reveal supporting prices along with the efficient allocation itself. Thus, the indispensable role of prices for implementing efficient allocations is now made clear. This result holds regardless of the agents' incentives, even if the agents report truthfully.
In the combinatorial allocation problem, efficient communication must name (at least) one price for each of the 2 L − 1 possible bundles, where L is the number of objects. We demonstrate that all possible monotonic price vectors must be used, hence the required communication is at least as extensive as full revelation of one agent's preferences. Even if we only require a better approximation of efficiency than that obtained by auctioning off all objects as a bundle, we must still use at least ¡ L L/2 ¢ bits in a two-bidder auction.
With L = 50 (a realistic number), this amount of information roughly corresponds to more than 250 million typewritten pages. We also show that even if approximation is required only on expectation, for some probability distribution over valuations, it still requires exponential communication in L. These results imply that for realistic values of L, any combinatorial auction design or other "preference elicitation" scheme suggested in the literature would either run for a prohibitively long time, or, if stopped after some reasonable time, would not produce an efficient or even approximately efficient allocation.
Our results should not be taken to imply that all real-life combinatorial auctions are useless, any more than Arrow's impossibility theorem implies that all real-life institution are useless. Rather, by showing that no institution is guaranteed to achieve good results on the universal preference domain, Arrow's theorem has led researchers to examine the performance of specific institutions on restricted domains. Similarly, by showing that there does not exist a practical auction design that works well for all possible combinatorial preferences over many objects, we hope to motivate auction designers to focus on specific classes of preferences or probability distributions over them. However, the burden should be on the proposer of a particular design to characterize the environments on which it works well. The tools developed in the present paper will be useful for this purpose, as we have demonstrated by examining the communication burden for the cases of submodular, homogeneous, and substitute valuations.
Finally, we have clarified the validity of measuring the communication burden of efficiency with the dimension of the required message space, as is common in the economic literature. The key question is whether this measure accurately reflects the difficulty of approximating efficiency with a discretized mechanism. We find that the dimensionality of message space is indicative of the complexity of achieving a "truly polynomial" approximation of efficiency. On the other hand, a somewhat slower but still practical "fully polynomial" approximation is sometimes achieved with much less communication. In such cases, the economic measure may seriously overstate the "hardness" of the communication problem. A dramatic example of this is offered by Calsamiglia's (1977) model of allocating a homogeneous divisible good, in which exact efficiency requires infinite-dimensional communication, but we demonstrate a fully polynomial approximation mechanism.
Appendix: A Set Packing Lower Bound
Our lower bound for the set packing problem will use a reduction from the following "approximate-disjointness" problem which was studied in Alon et al. (1999) :
The Approximate Disjointness Problem: Each player i ∈ N holds a subset B i ⊂ T of a finite set T . We are required to distinguish between the following two extreme cases:
• Negative: ∩ i∈N B i 6 = ∅,
• Positive: for every i 6 = j, B i ∩ B j = ∅.
A lower bound on the required communication of cT /N 4 for some fixed constant c > 0 was given in Alon et al. (1999) for randomized protocols (with two-sided error).
The lower bound was improved by Jaikumar Radhakrishnan and Venkatesh Srinivasan to ln 2 · T/N for deterministic and nondeterministic protocols.
Let us now define the approximate set packing problem. Each agent i ∈ N agents holds a collection A i ⊂ 2 L . The objective is to approximate the packing number -the number of subsets in ∪ i∈N A i that are packed together, i.e., are pairwise disjoint. We will prove a lower bound on the communication complexity of distinguishing between the case where the packing number is 1 (i.e, any two sets S i ∈ A i and S j ∈ A j for i, j ∈ N intersect) and the case where there exist N disjoint sets S 1 ∈ A 1 , ..., S N ∈ A N , and so the packing number is N.
We reduce this problem from the approximate-disjointness problem on a family T of partitions of set L into N subsets. That is, each t ∈ T is a partition (t 1 , . . . , t N ) of L.
We require family T to have the following property:
Definition 4 A family T of partitions of set L among N agents has the pairwiseintersection property if for every t 0 , t 00 ∈ T such that t 0 6 = t 00 we have t 0 i ∩ t 00 j 6 = ∅ for every i, j ∈ N, i.e., any two elements of different partitions intersect. Proof. We use the probabilistic method: Construct each partition t = 1, . . . T randomly, by randomly and independently placing each element of L with equal probability in one of the parts of t. Perform this construction independently for allṫ. Now, for given i, j ∈ N and t 0 , t 00 = 1, ..., T such that t 0 6 = t 00 ,
The probability that t 0 i ∩ t 00 j = ∅ for some i, j ∈ N and t 0 , t 00 = 1, ..., T such that t 0 6 = t 00 is at most N 2 T 2 times that number. Therefore, when N 2 T 2 e −L/N 2 < 1, with a positive probability we obtain a family of partitions with the pairwise-intersection property, hence such a family must exist.
We can now specify the reduction of approximate disjointness on a set T to the approximate set packing problem. Set T is taken to represent a family of partitions of L among N with the pairwise intersection property. Agent i receiving as input a set B i ⊂ T constructs the collection A i = {t i |t ∈ B i }. Now, if there exists t ∈ ∩ i B i , then (t 1 , . . . , t N )
constitutes an N-packing. If, on the other hand, B i ∩ B j = ∅ for all i 6 = j, then for any two sets t 0 i ∈ A i and t 00 j ∈ A j we have t 0 6 = t 00 and thus by the pairwise intersection property, t 0 i ∩ t 00 j 6 = ∅ for every i, j ∈ N, hence the packing number is at most 1. From the lower bounds described above for the approximate disjointness problem we obtain the following lower bounds for the set packing problem:
Theorem 2 Any N-player protocol (deterministic or nondeterministic) realizing an approximation ratio higher than 1/N for the set packing problem communicates at least 
